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In the ﬁrst century b.c., Marcus Terentius Varro used the terms singularis
and multitudinis in his grammar of Latin, De Lingua Latina, to refer to two
classes of morphological marking (cf. Taylor 1996). Soon after Varro’s writ-
ing, the term pluralis replaced multitudinis (e.g. in Marcus Fabius Quintil-
ian’s Institutio oratoria in the ﬁrst century A.D.) while the term singularis
caught on. Varro’s choice of terminology seems to have been inspired by
a semantic intuition: Singularis literally means ‘alone’ and presumably was
taken to mean that the cardinality of the intended referent of a noun is equal to
one. Multitudinis, on the other hand, derives from multitudo (‘multitude/great
number’).1 Pluralis, which replaced Varro’s term, derives from plus (‘more’).
This choice of terminology suggests that multitudinis/pluralis forms entail
that the cardinality of the intended referent is greater than one. Varro’s term
singular and the term plural have come to be widely used in the linguis-
tic literature as many languages display a similar distinction as Latin does.
Moreover, Varro’s semantic intuition is widely accepted in current semantic
work. For example, a fairly recent work on the semantics of plurality simply
states: [Plurality] just means ‘more than one’ (Lasersohn 1995, ix).
There are, however, several cases where the plural does not seem to imply
cardinality greater than one. Consider the a. examples in (1) through (4), and
compare them to the b. examples where two or more (or zwei (‘two’) in the
German (4b)) is added to the plural noun.2
(1) a. You’re welcome to bring your children.
b. You’re welcome to bring your two or more children.
(2) a. Every boy should invite his sisters.
b. Every boy should invite his two or more sisters.
(3) a. No chairs are available.
b. Two or more chairs aren’t available
(4) a. Könnten
Could
Sie
pro.3PL
bitte
please
etwas
a little
rücken.
move
‘Could you please move over.’
12 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
b. Könnten
Could
Sie
pro.3PL
zwei
two
bitte
please
etwas
a little
rücken.
move
‘Could you two please move over.’
Each of these pairs shows that the plural does not mean the same as explicitly
adding two or more: In (1), the plural in (a) can be used if the speaker is un-
sure about the number of children of the addressee, but to use the (b)-sentence
the speaker has to be sure that the addressee have two or more children. In
(2), the plural in (a) only requires that some of the boys have more than one
sister, whiletwo ormorein (b)requires thatall havemore thanone. In(3), the
plural in (a) excludes even the availability of one chair, while two or more as
in (b) actually implicates the availability of one chair. Finally, (4a) shows that
the plural pronoun sie in German can be used to address a single individual,
but this is impossible in (4b) where zwei (‘two’) is added. The phenomena
illustrated in (1) through (4) are problems for Varro’s semantics of the plural.
In this paper, we call Varro’s theory and its modern descendants the Strong
Theory of the plural. We argue instead for the Weak Theory, where the mean-
ing of the plural is strictly weaker than that of the singular. In the weak theory,
pragmatic principles block the use of the plural in cases where the singular is
appropriate, rather than its inherent semantic content. We are not the ﬁrst to
propose that Varro’s strong theory be replaced by some version of the weak
theory. However, previous writers focus on the problem the strong theory has
with the determiner no illustrated by (3) (Hoeksema 1983; van Eijck 1983;
Schwarzschild 1996; Beck and Sauerland 2000). A fellow Roman, Chier-
chia (1998), defends Varro’s strong theory against this particular criticism.
Namely, Chierchia proposes to simply change the semantics of no in such a
way that the plural no chairs (and also the singular no chair) are equivalent to
no chair or chairs. In this paper, however, we show a set of other arguments
for the weak theory from several different kinds of evidence. In the process,
we also spell out the weak theory in more detail than what previous research
has accomplished.
Our arguments also show how several different types of evidence can be
brought to bear on the same linguistic issue. In particular, we present ev-
idence from adult competence in sections 2, 3, and 4, evidence from child
performance in 5, and evidence from adult performance in 6. In the initial
section 1 that follows, though, we spell out the two accounts that we com-
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1 Two Theories of the Plural
In this section, we spell out the two accounts of number we compare; the
strong and weak theory. We will then compare these two accounts in the
following sections.
For concreteness, we adopt the proposal argued for in Sauerland (2003)
that agreement features express presuppositions and are interpreted in a sep-
arate lexical head, φ, that takes DP as its complement. Sauerland (2003)
shows that number marking on the common noun itself cannot be assigned
an interpretation, and argues that number marking on nouns as well as on
determiners, adjectives, and verbs is the reﬂex of syntactic agreement with
number marking in φ. In this theory, the interpretation of feature singular is
the purely presuppositional requirement that its complement refer to a single
atomic entity.
(5) [[SING]](x) is deﬁned only if #x = 1
[[SING]](x) = x wherever it is deﬁned
We assume here that entities are conceptualized in a way that can be captured
by the mereological notions atom and part of (we leave mass nouns for future
research). For example, John is conceptualized as a single atomic entity,
while John and Bill are conceptualized as a non-atomic entity that has the
two atomic parts that correspond to John and Bill and no other parts. We
assume that the operator # gives the number of atomic parts of an entity.
The semantics of the plural is the only place in which the strong and weak
theory differ. The strong theory amounts to the semantics in (6).
(6) [[PLUR]](x) is deﬁned only if #x > 1
[[PLUR]](x) = x wherever it is deﬁned
The weak theory, on the other hand, assume that the plural has no presuppo-
sition. The lexical entry in (7) captures this proposal.
(7) [[PLUR]](x) is always deﬁned
[[PLUR]](x) = x wherever it is deﬁned
On the weak theory the distribution of the plural feature is therefore not re-
stricted by an inherent presupposition, but by pragmatics. In particular, Heim
(1991) argues for the principle Maximize Presupposition which can be di-
rectly applied in this case. Heim’s principle requires that, of two alternative
morphemes, the one that has a stronger presupposition must be used when-
ever its presupposition is satisﬁed. This principle does not apply to singular
and plural when the strong theory of the plural is adopted because the pre-
suppositions are mutually exclusive. But on the weak theory of the plural,4 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
the principle applies since the presupposition of the plural is strictly weaker
than that of the singular: Any entity x that satisﬁes the presupposition of
SING also satisﬁes the vacuous presupposition of PLUR. We derive the fol-
lowing corollary of maximize presupposition for number: Use the plural only
if the singular is blocked. One consideration that can block the singular is, of
course, if the referent is non-singular.
Consider the examples in (8) for an illustration of both the weak and the
strong theory.
(8) a. The boy, Kai, smiles.
b. The boys, Kai and Hannes, smile.
On the versions we are considering both accounts assume that the syntactic
structure of the subject in (8) is the following, with the appropriate number
marking in φ:
φP
 
  
φ
[SG/PL]
DP
   
D
the
NP
   
*boy
Following Sauerland (2003), we assume that the NP *boy in (8) is the
number-neutral predicate that is true of any entity that has at least one boy
as its part and exclusively boys as its parts. The deﬁnite determiner the picks
out the maximal entity satisfying its complement. If only Kai is salient, as in
(8a), the DP therefore refers to Kai. Since Kai is conceptualized as an atom,
the presupposition of the singular is satisﬁed, and singular marking is there-
fore possible in this situation. Furthermore, plural marking is predicted to be
semantically anomalous. On the strong theory, PLUR would presuppose that
Kai contains more than one atom, which is not the case. On the weak the-
ory, on the other hand, the presupposition of PLUR is satisﬁed, but PLUR can
only be used if presupposition of the singular is not also satisﬁed. However,
the presupposition of SING is satisﬁed in (8a) and therefore use of PLUR is
anomalous. In (8b), on the other hand, two boys are salient and therefore the
DP-constituent in the structure above refers to the plurality that has these two
boys as its atomic parts. Since the plurality of Kai and Hannes itself is not
an atom, the presupposition of SING is not satisﬁed in this case. The plural,
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supposition of PLUR is satisﬁed, and on the weak theory it follows from the
fact that SING is blocked.
2 Mixed Reference
Consider the following scenario: You are inviting an old friend who you have
not seen in years. You heard that he has a family now, but you have no idea
how many children he has. In this scenario, you could use the plural as in (9a),
but the singular in (9b) would be odd. You could also use the disjunction in
(9c), but this seems less natural than (9a).3
(9) a. You are welcome to bring your children.
b. #You are welcome to bring your child.
c. You are welcome to bring your child or your children.
In this scenario, if your friend happened to have only one child, he would
naturally assume that he may bring his child.
Consider also the difference between (10a) and (10b). If the plural leads
to a presupposition that you have more than one child, only the conditional in
(10b) should block the projection of this presupposition. But instead, (10a)
seems to not presuppose that the addressee have a certain number of chil-
dren. (10b), on the other hand, presupposes that the addressee have at least
one child. On the weak theory, the facts in (10) follow from the well-known
generalization that a conditional “if p, q” presupposes whatever q presup-
poses except for those presuppositions of q entailed by p.
(10) a. You may bring your children if you have any.
b. You may bring your children if you have more than one.
The examples in (11) can be used to make a similar point. Consider the
following scenario: The boys in the football club want to have a party. They
wonder though how to get girls to come to their party. The coach knows
exactly how many sisters each boy has. Every boy has at least one sister,
and in particular, Bill has exactly one sister, while Tom has three. The coach
could then use (11a), but not (11b), to suggest that all the sisters be invited.
(11) a. Every boy should invite his sisters to the party.
b. #Every boy should invite his sister to the party.
In (11), the deﬁnite description contains a variable (the pronoun his) and
depending on the value assigned to this pronoun the deﬁnite refers to differ-
ent entities. The generalization is that the plural must be used if the deﬁnite
refers to an entity that contains more than one atom for at least some of the
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boy has exactly one sister. We assume that the examples in (9) are analyzed
in a similar way by assuming that the DP your children contains a world
variable that ranges over the worlds in the common ground. As long as the
addressee has more than one child in some of the worlds, the plural must
be used. The tests in (9) and (11) are similar to one Greenberg (1966, p. 30)
presents and attributes to Arab grammarians, who introduced the term taghl¯ ıb
(‘dominance’)forit. Theargumentinthiscaseisthatonlytheunmarkedform
of a pair of two features can be used to refer to a plurality of individuals only
some of which have the marked property. One of Greenberg’s examples is
the difference between the plural of father and mother in Spanish: los padres
(‘the fathers’) can also mean ‘the parents’, while las madres (‘the mothers’)
only means ‘the mothers’. The difference follows from the assumption that
the masculine feature is less marked than the feminine feature. While the
dominance test cannot be conducted for number marking using just a sin-
gle DP because the DP would be plural for independent reasons, the clausal
examples in (9) and (11) with a variable in the DP are closely related.
The difference between singular and plural marking in (9) and (11) fol-
lows directly from the weak theory of number marking we advocate. Con-
sider ﬁrst (11). We assume that universal quantiﬁers project presuppositions
from their scope universally as in (12).
(12) [[every]](P)(Q) is deﬁned only if ∀x : P(x)=1 → x ∈domain(Q) and
∃x : P(x)=1;
[[every]](P)(Q)=1 if and only if ∀x : P(x)=1 → Q(x)=1
From (12), it follows that the inherent presupposition of the singular projects
the presupposition: Every boy has exactly one sister. The plural, however,
can be used whenever the presupposition of the singular is not satisﬁed (and
in addition the existence presupposition of the deﬁnite that every boy has at
least one sister is satisﬁed). This predicts that the plural is felicitous whenever
at least one boy has more than one sister. Note that the strong semantics of
the plural would predict a stronger presupposition for the plural; namely, that
each boy has two or more sisters. As we have argued, only the prediction of
the weak theory is correct. The account carries over to (9) if we assume that
for a sentence to be felicitous in a context, it must be deﬁned in all worlds of
the common ground of that context.
3 Plural Pronouns with Singular Reference
In many cases, plural pronouns can be used to refer to single individuals. One
cross-linguistically very widespread case is the pluralis reverentiae. ConsiderThe Plural Is Semantically Unmarked 7
the German example in (13), which literally says “Could they please move
a little?”, using a third person plural pronoun. (13), however, is the normal
way a German adult would address another adult he does not know, e.g. the
person sitting next to him on the plane.
(13) Könnten
Could
sie
pro.3PL
bitte
please
etwas
a little
rücken?
move sideways
‘Could you please move a little?’
If sie is replaced with the second person singular pronoun du as in (14), the
sentence would only be used to either address a child or another adult that the
speaker is friendly with.
(14) Könntest
Could
du
pro.2SG
bitte
please
etwas
a little
rücken?
move sideways
This phenomenon is cross-linguistically very common. A typological
study by Head (1978) lists 84 languages that use a shift of number in sec-
ond person pronouns from singular to plural to show degrees of respect or
social distance.4 German is slightly unusual in so far as it uses the third per-
son rather than the second person plural form. More frequently, the second
person plural pronoun is used, which is for example attested in Elizabethan
English. Consider the two examples in (15) from Shakespeare’s King Lear
(4.6, l.7–8 and l.10). The speaker here switches from the second person sin-
gular thou to the more polite second person plural you as he forms the opinion
that addressee is of equal social rank.
(15) a. Thou speak’st in better phrase and matter than thou didst
b. Methinks you’re better spoken.
Modern English has lost the singular/plural distinction in the second per-
son pronouns and with it the use of this distinction to express respect. How-
ever, the phenomenon of Singular They in Modern English, which is illus-
trated by (16) is, we believe, similar. In (16), plural they can be used even it
was just one umbrella owned by a single person that was left behind.
(16) Someone left their umbrella.
Brown and Levinson (1987) develop one idea to explain the possibility of
using a plural pronouns with singular reference based on the strong theory
of the plural. Their assumption is, if we understand it correctly, that the
speaker pretends to be addressing a group of people even when he is just
addressing a single person. Addressing a group is less direct than singling out
the addressee with a singular pronoun, and therefore considered more polite.
This indirect address is conventionalized in those languages that allow the8 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
use of plural pronouns for the polite address of a single person. However, the
proposalofBrownandLevinson(1987)hasanumberofproblems. Forone, it
does not extend to singular they in (16). Furthermore, (17) presents a serious
problem for the proposal: Imagine a scenario where a surgeon addresses a
patient, Ms. Meier, whose nose needs to be operated on. It would be very
natural to use the plural sie to address her. But, if the surgeon was hereby
addressing an imagined group of people, this group of people should have
more than one nose. Therefore, Brown and Levinson’s proposal predicts that
(17) with the plural marking on Nase should be used by the surgeon. Yet,
(17) is distinctly odd unless Ms. Meier actually has more than one nose.5 As
far as we can see, (17) is fatal for Brown and Levinson’s proposal.
(17) #Frau
Ms.
Meier,
Meier,
ihre
pro.3PL
Nasen
nose-PL
müssen
must-PL
operiert
operated
werden.
be.
‘Ms. Meier, you must receive surgery on your noses.’
In sum, we do not know of any proposal based on the strong theory of the
plural that would cover all uses of plural pronouns with singular reference.
One idea that was occasionally brought up to us after presentations is that the
use of the plural is a metaphor for power in the polite pronouns. While it
might be worthwhile to try to make this idea more precise, as far as we can
see, the fact that also a pluralis modestiae exists is going to create problems
for this idea. This label has been given for the use of the ﬁrst person plural
instead of the singular in certain contexts. For example, writers in the natural
sciences are exhorted to use we instead of I to refer to themselves even when
a paper has only a single author. In these cases, the plural is not intended to
stress the authority of the author, but rather to avoid the pronoun I for stylistic
reasons. On the weak theory, on the other hand, it is expected that in case I is
blocked the plural form can be used. In sum, we believe that the different uses
of plural pronouns with singular reference constitute a signiﬁcant problem for
the strong theory of the plural.
On the weak theory, on the other hand, singular reference of plural pro-
nouns does not create a semantic problem at all since the semantics of the
plural does not exclude singular reference. If the singular cannot be used, it
follows that the plural can occur despite singular reference. The remaining
question is why the singular cannot be used. We assume that various stylistic
conventions can block the singular pronoun: In the case of singular they, the
gender marked singular pronouns he/she/it must be avoided when the gender
of the referent is unknown, and therefore the plural form can be used. In the
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be employed. Finally, in the pluralis reverentiae cases, the second person
singular pronoun is blocked by a convention in certain languages. This ac-
counts for the shift in Elizabethan English from singular thou to plural you.I n
Modern German, where in addition we observe a shift in person, we assume
that third person is semantically vacuous just like the plural, and the polite-
ness convention blocks not just the second person singular du, but also third
person singular er/sie/es and second person plural ihr. Therefore, only the
third person plural pronoun remains and is used. This line of reasoning re-
ceives further support from the observation that in the historical development
of German, ihr and er/sie/es have been used with second person singular ref-
erence, and that at stages where such uses of ihr and er/sie/es cooccurred with
singular uses of sie, sie was always considered the more reverential (Simon
2003).
4 Indeﬁnites in Downward Entailing Contexts
In this section, we look at an argument from number marking on indeﬁnites
in downward entailing environments. Previous literature has shown, as we
mentioned in the introduction, that plural marking on the argument of English
determiner no does not exclude singularity. In this section, we consider num-
ber marking on indeﬁnites more broadly and then present an analysis within
the presuppositional account of number that assumes the weak analysis of the
plural.
Consider the examples in (18) where plural marking occurs in the scope
of negation.
(18) a. Kai hasn’t found any eggs.
b. Kai has found no eggs.
Both sentences are judged true only if Kai has not even found a single egg. It
seems that generally plural indeﬁnites in a downward entailing environment
include reference to a singular: (19a) on the label of a yoghurt bottle says that
there is not even a single artiﬁcial ingredient in the yoghurt. In (19b), if the
conditional was true only if John ate a plurality of apples, there should be at
least two less in the basket. But, while the sentence is a tautology with one
less, it would be false with two less unless John has a habit of never eating
single apples.
(19) a. Without artiﬁcial ingredients
b. If John had eaten any apples from the basket, there would be at
least one/#two less in the basket.10 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
It seems therefore that number marking on indeﬁnites in a downward en-
tailing environment does not affect truth conditions. Outside the scope of
negation, however, number marking on indeﬁnites does affect truth condi-
tions. For example, (20a) entails that there is more than one egg still hidden,
while (20b) does not. In fact, (20b) has an implicature that only one egg is
still hidden.
(20) a. Some eggs are still hidden.
b. Some egg is still hidden.
Furthermore, (21) entails that there is more one than one egg that Kai could
not ﬁnd. Since the indeﬁnite here cannot take scope below negation, though
it is c-commanded by it, (21) shows that the semantic scope of negation de-
termines whether number marking has an effect on interpretation.
(21) Kai couldn’t ﬁnd certain/some eggs.
As far as we know, the only attempt to account for this set of facts is a
speculative suggestion by Sauerland (2003). Chierchia (1998) suggests that
number marking on indeﬁnites is generally not interpreted, but that cannot
account for indeﬁnites outside the scope of negation as in (20) and (21). Our
account builds on some of the suggestions by Sauerland (2003), but differs
from it in the ways noted below.
For the determiner no, we assume that it must be decomposed syntacti-
cally into an indeﬁnite and negation (Bech 1955/1957; Jacobs 1980; Penka
2002, and others). We therefore focus on the examples with the indeﬁnites
some and any. We assume that the indeﬁnites are analyzed as existential
quantiﬁers of the type of generalized quantiﬁers.
(22) [[some/any]](P)(Q)=1i f f .∃x : P(x)=1∧Q(x)=1
Consider ﬁrst indeﬁnites that do not occur in the scope of negation as in
(20). We assume that the indeﬁnite must undergo quantiﬁer raising from the
position below the number morpheme. For (20), this derives (23) as the LF-
representation.
(23) [some egg] λx SING/PLUR(x) is still hidden.
Since SINGand PLURexpress a presupposition, we need to know at this point
how presuppositions project from the scope of an existential and how this
interacts with presupposition maximization. For the projection question, we
assumewhatseemstobethemoststraightforwardproposal; namelythatthere
is no projection, but that the presupposition becomes part of the assertion.6
This proposal is already implicit in the lexical entry in (22) since we assume
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the P(x)=1 can only be fulﬁlled if x satisﬁes the presuppositions of P. The
statement of the lexical entry in (24) makes the proposal more explicit.
(24) [[some/any]](P)(Q)=1i f f .
∃x ∈ domain(P)∩domain(Q) : P(x)=1∧Q(x)=1
The interpretation assigned to (23) with singular therefore can be paraphrased
as: There is an atomic entity that is an egg and is still hidden. For the plural,
the weak theory predicts the paraphrase: There is some entity that consists
of one or more eggs and is still hidden. In neither case, the interpretation of
the entire sentence has a presupposition, and therefore presupposition maxi-
mization does not apply straightforwardly. In fact, the two representations are
predicted to be equivalent once distributivity is taken into account: The sin-
gular entails the plural straightforwardly because we are assuming the weak
theory of the plural. But, the reverse entailment also holds since being an
egg and being hidden are true of a plurality if and only if they are true of
all atomic parts of that plurality. Therefore, this analysis correctly predicts
that number marking does not affect truth conditions for occurrences of in-
deﬁnites in a downward entailing environment as in (18). For indeﬁnites not
in the scope of negation as in (23), however, number marking does make a
contribution. We propose the generalization in (25):
(25) Maximize presupposition applies to the scope of an existential if this
strengthens the entire utterance.
Consider how (25) applies to (23) with plural marking. The scope of the
existential is interpreted as a total function since plural does not introduce a
presupposition. The alternative with singular, however, is a partial function
deﬁned only for atoms. Presupposition maximization applied to the scope of
the existential therefore predicts that the domain of the function excludes all
atoms. This requires then that there be a plurality of eggs that is still hidden.
After the application of (25), the singular version of (23) has strictly
weaker truth conditions than the plural. Therefore, the implicature that no
more than one egg is still hidden is predicted. It is interesting to note that pre-
supposition maximization and implicature computation must apply sequen-
tially in this case.
For examples like (18), maximize presupposition applied to the scope of
the existential does not lead to a strengthening of the entire utterance because
in this case the existential occurs in a downward entailing environment. Since
presupposition maximization applied to the scope adds a condition to the
scope of the existential, it makes the entire utterance logically weaker when
the existential occurs in a downward entailing environment. (25) blocks pre-12 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
supposition maximization in this case. Therefore our analysis predicts that
number marking on existentials in a downward entailing environment is with-
out truth-conditional effect.7
5 Evidence from Child Performance
The data from adult competence we considered in the previous sections argue
that the singular and the plural involve fundamentally different interpretive
processes: The lexical entry for the singular inherently presupposes cardinal-
ity one. The plural, however, possesses no inherent presupposition. The in-
terpretive effect of the plural arises only from a comparison with the singular
regulatedbythemaximofmaximizepresupposition. Thecomparisonprocess
which is involved in the interpretation of the plural is very similar to the the
Gricean model of the process that derives scalar implicatures. This similarity
is the point of departure of the experimental evidence from child language,
we present in this section. Recent work by Noveck (2001), Gualmini et al.
(2001) and Papafragou and Musolino (2003) has shown that children acquire
scalar implicatures quite late, such that many children at age 5 do not ex-
hibit adult-like behavior in implicature tests. We therefore hypothesized that
children of the same age group would not understand plural marking in an
adult-like fashion.
The experiment which we report here is inspired by a pilot study of Anne
Vainikka, which is reported in de Villiers and Roeper (1991). Unfortunately
the original data of this study seem to be lost. According to the brief report
of the study children around age 5 answer to questions like (26) with ‘yes’,
while adults would answer ‘no’.
(26) Does a dog have tails?
We conducted an experiment on children’s performance on items that con-
tain bare plurals. The subjects were 14 monolingual English speaking chil-
dren from 3;4 to 5;9. The children were tested at day care centers in Amherst,
Massachusetts and Storrs, Connecticut, USA.
In the experiment, each child was asked 13 Yes/No questions. The exper-
imenter held and manipulated a puppet, and pretended that the puppet was
asking these questions. The child’s task was to help the toy ﬁgure by answer-
ing ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the questions. Examples of the test items are shown in
(27). The experiment contained 5 test items. The test sentences were all sen-
tences to which we expect adults would answer ‘no’. In fact, the experiment
on adult performance we show in the following section shows that adults
overwhelmingly answer ‘no’ to such questions.The Plural Is Semantically Unmarked 13
(27) a. Does a girl have noses?
b. Does a boy have tongues?
The experiment furthermore contained 8 control items. Examples of control
items are in (28). For some control items, the adult response is ‘no’, while
for others it is ‘yes’.
(28) a. Does a ﬁsh have legs?
b. Does a boy have beaks?
c. Does a cat have feet?
The participants were instructed that the toy ﬁgure is a space alien who has
lots of questions about life on Earth. The participants were asked to help the
toy ﬁgure by answering its questions. The 13 items were presented in the
same order to all participants.
The result of the experiment is shown below. For the test items, the chil-
dren answered ‘yes’ to the questions 96% of the time. Recall that the adult-
like performance is to say ‘no’ to these questions. For the control items, on
the other hand, the children gave the adult-like responses most of the time.
The result is highly signiﬁcant in an unpaired, two-tailed t-test (p <. 00001).
(29) a. Test items: 4% adult-like (67/70)
b. Control items: 97% adult-like (3/112)
The result is consistent with our hypothesis that children of this age group
do not understand plurality in the way as adults do, and therefore corroborates
the weak theory of plurality. Of course, the effect we observe might also
be due to other factors. Speciﬁcally, we want to consider two alternative
explanations: that the children do not perceive plural morphology and that
the children treat questions like (27) in the same way as downward entailing
environments are treated by adults as discussed in the previous section.
Consider ﬁrst the hypothesis that the children did not perceive plural mor-
phology, which was word-ﬁnal /s/ in all of our test items. We attempted to
test for children’s perception of /s/ in a independent way in a pilot experi-
ment for six of the 14 participants, but the result did not prove that children
perceive /s/. Nevertheless, we think that it is unlikely that children gener-
ally are not capable to perceive plural marking in our test items. For one,
the absence of any determiner serves as an additional marker of plurality in
our test items. Furthermore, for one of the three items in our pilot experi-
ment subjects seemed to be sensitive to the presence of word-ﬁnal /s/: In this
item, children were asked (30a) and shown two pictures: One where Johnny
is shown with some boards, and one where Johnny is looking bored, which
would have been appropriate for (30b). 5 out of the six children selected the14 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
correct picture providing some indication that they perceived /s/ in this case.
(30) a. Where can you see Johnnie’s boards.
b. Where can you see Johnnie’s bored.
The other alternative hypothesis relates to our observation in the previ-
ous section that plural and singular are both interpreted as numberless and
therefore truth-conditionally equivalent in downward-entailing environments.
Whetherquestionsaredownward-entailingisunclearasfarasweknow. Even
if we assume that licensing of a negative polarity item (abbreviated NPI in the
following) is a sure test for being downward-entailing, questions exhibit an
intricate pattern: Work currently in progress by Yael Sharvit and Elena Guer-
zoni shows that some embedded questions license NPIs, while others do not
depending on the embedding verb.
Now consider again the matrix questions in (26) and (27). Here plural
morphology on the indeﬁnite does have a truth conditional effect. Otherwise,
(26) should be equivalent to the question Does a dog have a tail or tails?,
and therefore we would expect it to be answered with ‘yes’, and an analogous
point applies to (27). For the questions in (26) and (27), this does not corre-
spond to our intuitionms and our intuition was corroborated in the processing
experiment we report in the following section. This is not the only possible
outcome though. Imagine the following scenario. You have just moved into
a new ofﬁce. You have been talking for weeks now about how you really like
to look outside from inside your ofﬁce, and how you hope your new ofﬁce
will have a window. You were not able to ﬁnd out about this however, up to
the day you moved in. In the evening of that day, your friend calls you and
asks the question in (31). It would be odd for you to answer (31b) instead of
(31a), even when you assume the facts to be just like those under which (30)
and (29) were asked, in that your ofﬁce has only one window, just as a dog
has only one tail (cf. Krifka 1989).
(31) Does your ofﬁce have windows / a window?
a. Yes, (only one though.)
b. #No, only one.
Number marking does not seem to make a difference in (31), while it appears
to matter in (26) and (27). We suggest that the questions in (26) and (31)
exemplify two different kinds of questions, and that this difference explains
the difference in responses. In the following, we will call questions like (31)
true information seeking questions, while we refer to questions like (26) as
exam type questions. The difference between the two types of questions is
whether the questioner knows the answer to the question or not.The Plural Is Semantically Unmarked 15
The distinction we draw between information seeking questions and exam
type questions, however, seems to be irrelevant to the interpretation of NPIs.
Both types of questions license NPIs. Speciﬁcally, (32) shows that an exam-
type question licenses the NPI ever.
(32) For 50 points: Did Shakespeare ever get married?
From the previous three paragraphs, we have seen that the interpretation of
indeﬁnite plurals in questions is subject to several pragmatic factors that we
did not control for in our initial acquisition study. Therefore, it is possible that
the effect we observed is due to factors other than the process the interpreta-
tion of the plural requires, and future work should investigate this possibility.
For the time being, however, we conclude that our initial result is predicted by
the weak semantics of the plural given the acquisition results on implicatures.
6 Evidence from Adult Performance
If something is impossible for children, it might well be hard for adults too.
The work we report in this section investigates whether the additional mental
processes that are required in the interpretation of the plural can be detected
in adult performance. In particular, we expect that comprehending a sentence
containing a bare plural requires the comparison process that is assumed by
the weak theory. If two is added to the plural, however, the comparison pro-
cess is no longer necessary for the interpretation of the plural. If the use of
mental resources was to correlate with reading times, we expect a reading
time difference between the two items.
To test this prediction we conducted a processing experiment. 43 under-
graduate students of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst read 40 sim-
ple yes/no-questions on a computer screen. They were asked to indicate their
answer to each question by pressing a designated key on the computer key-
board. We recorded each response and measured the response time. One
subject was excluded due to an extremely long response time (> 1 min).
Each participant saw ten questions of each of the following types, the lists
were counterbalanced, and no subject saw more than one type of question of
each item.
(33) a. Does a dog have tails?
b. Does a dog have two tails?
c. Does a goat have horns?
d. Does a goat have two horns?
We expected no responses for questions of type (33a) and (33b) and yes re-
sponses for questions of type (33c) and (33d).16 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
For all questions, subjects shared our intuitions more then 85% of the time.
We will therefore call this response the“correct response”. The graph onpage
16 indicates though that there was a lower percentage of correct responses for
questions of type (33a) (column 1) than for questions of type (33b) – (33c)
(columns2–4respectively). This is a signiﬁcant difference as shown by the
followingtests: Aone-way ANOVAbetweenallconditionsshowstheretobea
highly signiﬁcant difference (p<0.005). A second one-way ANOVAbetween
the conditions corresponding to columns two, three and four does not indicate
a signiﬁcant difference (p = 0.09). A paired t-test between data reﬂected by
columns one and two shows this difference to be signiﬁcant (p < 0.05).
Four of our subjects consistently gave positive answers to questions of the
type of (33a). When excluding these subjects from the data, we ﬁnd the same
pattern as described above, though due to the high variability in the data for
responses to the questions of (33a) type, it is only a numerical trend.
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We excluded the four subjects that gave consistently positive answers for
questions of type (33a) from our analysis of response time data.
To correct for length differences between our conditions we calculated
response times in milliseconds per character (the items had an average length
of 27.225 characters). We will report times in milliseconds per character
below.
For questions with a negative answer and explicit numeral, as in (33b),
the response time was on average 19.6 ms faster than for questions with a
negative answer but without a numeral, as in (33a). By a paired t-test, the
difference was found to be highly signiﬁcant (p < 0.0005). For questions
with an afﬁrmative answer, the presence of a numeral was not found to have
an effect on response times. Their average response time differed by 2.7 ms,
but this difference could not be shown to be signiﬁcant (paired t-test, p =
0.55). Finally, we found a signiﬁcant interaction between the two conditionsThe Plural Is Semantically Unmarked 17
– absence or presence of a numeral and positive or negative answer (2×2-
ANOVA with subjects as random factor, p < 0.001).
In these results, we found the difference between the bare plural and the
explicit numeral in the case of questions expecting a negative answer. This
difference corroborates the weak theory of the plural in combination with our
assumption that the extra mental work involved with the bare plural should
translate into greater reading times. For questions requiring the positive an-
swer, however, we found no signiﬁcant difference between the bare plural
and the explicit numeral. This result is unexpected since comprehension of
the bare plural in this case should also involve comparison.
While of course many interpretations of this result are possible, here is
one suggestion how the result can be subsumed under the weak theory of the
plural. The result shows that, contrary to our initial hypothesis, a comparison
process per se does not lead to a signiﬁcant increase in reading time. How-
ever, what we detected was an interference between the two sentences exactly
in those cases in which they predict different truth values or responses. In the
items expecting a negative response, the competing singular question would
be answered ‘yes’, leading to a conﬂict. In the cases where we expect a posi-
tive response the singular questions would be answered ‘yes’ as well, but this
time in agreement with the plural question. Therefore, no additional process-
ing time is required in this case. This suggests that simultaneous computation
of the truth values of two sentences that are to be compared is easily possible,
but that if the two sentences actually lead to different responses, they interfere
with each other and subjects require additional processing time to choose the
correct response.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we developed and argued for a weak theory of the plural. The
weak theory, which we present in 1, is characterized by the assumption that
the plural is not subject to an inherent lexical restriction as the singular is.
Rather, the plural is subject to pragmatic comparison with the singular, and
therefore cannot be used in most examples when the singular is possible.
The evidence we used to argue for this result came from several different
sources including experimental evidence, and therefore our study illustrates
how different types of evidence can be used in generative linguistics.
One type of evidence we relied on were cases where adults could use
the plural to refer to singularity. For reasons of space, we cannot consider
in detail some phenomena that seem to suggest that sometimes the opposite18 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
is possible too: singular morphology with plural reference. One anonymous
reviewer lists the following two phenomona in this category: the interrogative
pronouns who and what and indeﬁnite pronouns like man in German and on
in French.8
(34) a. Who/What is arriving on the train?
b. Man
one
kann
can
da
there
gut
well
essen.
eat
‘The food there is good.’
We propose that both examples in (34) involve reference to kinds. This has
been proposed for what before: Based on data from the there-existential con-
struction, Heim (1987)analyseswhat semanticallyaswhichkind ofthing.W e
propose to extend this account by analyzing who as which kind of person and
indeﬁnite pronouns as referring to the most general kind of person. Though
more details will need to be provided on this point, we show that data like
(34) can, in principal, be accounted for under our proposal.
Our result has several interesting implications. First, compare our result
with that of Greenberg (1966). Greenberg presents several tests for marked-
ness that rely on morphology and on semantic interpretation. Based on these
diagnostics, Greenberg claims that the singular is less marked than the plu-
ral, which is the exact opposite of our ﬁnding. Note that, though we did not
consider Greenberg’s account due to lack of space, all the arguments against
the strong theory of the plural we presented equally apply to Greenberg’s
account. Actually, Greenberg (1966) presents only morphological data in
support of his claim that the singular is unmarked. Hence, we propose that
our result implies that semantic and morphological markedness need to be
distinguished: The plural shows a mismatch between morphological and se-
mantic markedness. Morphological and semantic markedness have not been
distinguished as two different kinds of markedness before as far as we know.
A second interesting consequence of our result is that the interpretation of
the plural always involves an implicit comparison. The related comparison
processes with scalar implicatures have recently been an exciting area of psy-
cholinguistic investigation (see the references in section 5). If we are right in
claiming that similar comparison processes are involved in the interpretation
of the plural, this opens up a new line of investigation for the study of com-
parison processes, which we regard as quite promising since the underlying
semantic intuitions about number are usually sharp. The results in sections 5
and 6 are only preliminary steps in this direction. The results in section 5 cor-
respond directly to data from scalar implicatures and therefore argues for the
weak theory of the plural that we advoacate. The discussion in section 6 evenThe Plural Is Semantically Unmarked 19
provided one new insight concerning the general study of comparison pro-
cesses: We concluded that the parallel computation of semantic values itself
is not hard for the human processor, but that a comparison becomes difﬁcult
if the semantic values of two representations that are to be compared differ.
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Notes
1 Varro’s terms were actually loan-translations from Ancient Greek. Since Ancient
Greekalsohasadualformandthepluralisthereforeassociatedwithcardinalities
of three or greater, the term multitudinis is natural for the description of this
language. Daniel Taylor (p.c.) points out that Aristotle credits Protagoras with
the discovery of grammatical number.
2 Another class of relevant examples is exempliﬁed by (i). For lack of space, we
cannot address these here, but Sauerland (2003) offers an account.
(i) 1.0 children are missing.
3 Example (9c) is interesting to consider from the perspective of presupposition
projection since the presupposition of the ﬁrst disjunct at least is not globally
satisﬁed. It is therefore similar to e.g. the example (i), which is frequently dis-
cussed, and we believe any solution to (i) would carry over to (9c).
(i) Either there is no bathroom in this house or the bathroom is in an odd place.
4 Unfortunately, we have not been able to investigate the empirical basis of Head’s
typological generalization in a systematic way. For Bengali, Josef Bayer (p.c.)
has claimed that Head is empirically wrong. Furthermore, Head seems to include
languages like Spanish on his list where not personal plural pronoun is used
for polite address, but the special pronoun usted that has both a singular and a
plural form. However, for several other languages Head considers we know his
generalization to be empirically correct.20 Sauerland, Anderssen, and Yatsushiro
5 Instead the singular form of the noun as in (i) must be used. One reviewer points
out that, in the case of a surgeon addressing two people who both require an
operation on their nose, both the plural (17) and the singular (i) can be used,
though our account as stated predicts the plural to be obligatory.
(i) Ihre
pro.3PL
Nase
nose-SG
muss
must-SG
operiert
operated
werden.
be.
Note that the second person singular can sometimes be used when the speaker
addresses a group of people he is familiar with. For example, a teacher could
say (ii) to his pupils. We assume that use of the singular form to address a group
of people reﬂects a kind of distributivity at the speech act level such that each
member of the addressee group is addressed individually.
(ii) Du
pro.2SG
musst
must-SG
höﬂich
polite
sein.
be
This phenomenon ought to be investigated further, but this is beyond the scope
of this paper.
6 Here our account differs from the suggestion in Sauerland (2003) that indeﬁnites
project an existential presupposition, which is problematic because of (i) and
similar examples.
(i) There aren’t any unicorns.
7 Number marking on negative indeﬁnites, however, is not always free; Jonathan
Bobaljik (p.c.) provided us the contrast in (i). It seems that the singular must be
used when it is established that the cardinality is either one or zero.
(i) a. No regulation prohibits this.
b. ?No regulations prohibit this.
8 The reviewer also mentions examples like (i) as possibly problematic for our
account. We assume, though, that these contain a hidden variable that is bound
distributively by the subject, such that (i) can be treated analogously to sentences
like The soldiers each raise their right hand.
(i) Alle
All
heben
raise
die
the
rechte
right
Hand.
hand
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